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Although impairment of self-control is often assumed to be a defining feature of addiction, 
many addicts nonetheless display what appears to be a considerable amount of control over 
their addictive behavior. Not only do they act intentionally and frequently in a deliberate 
manner, there is evidence suggesting that they are responsive to many ordinary incentives and 
counter-incentives (Heyman 2009; Pickard 2015). Given the great variety of addicts and their 
ability to control their drug use, how can impairment of self-control still be taken as a defining 
feature of addiction? 
Clearly, if we want to hold on to this idea (as I think we should), a lot depends on how 
we understand the nature of self-control. In this chapter, I shall argue, first, that a difficulty with 
some standard views of self-control in the philosophical literature is that they see the 
impairment of addicts’ self-control only in terms of the role addiction plays in causing a certain 
kind of self-control conflict, either between the addict’s drug-oriented behavior and her all 
things considered judgment, or between this behavior and her long-term values. But addicts, 
problematically, also display impaired self-control in the absence of any such conflicts. Second, 
there is plenty of empirical evidence suggesting that diminished attentional and impulse control 
is an important part of the explanation of addictive behavior. I argue that while such diminished 
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control may produce self-control conflicts of the kind assumed in the philosophical literature, 
it need not do so. Still, it provides evidence that addicts have impaired self-control. By creating 
an inflexible and stimulus-bound practical perspective, diminished attention and impulse 
control mean that addicts’ decision-making gets shaped by their addiction rather than by their 
reasons. While this makes it very difficult for addicts to revise or abandon their drug-oriented 
behavioral pattern given good and sufficient reasons to do so, it does not rule out the possibility 
of their often exercising substantial control over their drug-oriented actions.  
 
1. Judgment-Based vs. Value-Based Self-Control 
Self-controlled persons are governed by motives that are, in some sense, constitutive of their 
“self.” In philosophical discussions of self-control, two kinds of motives tend to be highlighted. 
First, there are the motives that are expressed by the agent’s “all things considered” or “better” 
judgments. Second, there are the motives that are expressed by what the agent “genuinely 
values.” Since an agent’s all things considered judgement at a particular time need not reflect 
what she genuinely values, these motives are not necessarily the same. It is possible, therefore, 
to distinguish between a judgment-based and a value-based form of self-control.  
Consider first judgment-based self-control. Alfred Mele has argued that self-control is 
the contrary of what Aristotle called akrasia (incontinence, weakness of will), “a trait of 
character exhibited in uncompelled, intentional behavior that goes against the agent’s best or 
better judgment” (Mele 2002: 531). A best or better judgment is “a judgment to the effect that, 
on the whole, it would be best to A, or (instead) better to A than to B” (Mele 2010: 392). As 
Mele also points out, “Someone’s making a judgment […] is an event,” that is “at least 
suggestive of a belief arrived at on the basis of conscious deliberation” (Mele 2009: 6,7). 
According to a judgment-based view, then, self-control is a trait of character exhibited in 
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behavior that conforms with one’s best or better judgment in the face of temptation to act to the 
contrary.  
If self-control is the contrary of akrasia, it may seem that failures of self-control cannot 
occur in the absence of akrasia. That is, a person cannot fail to exercise self-control if he acts 
in conformity with his all things considered, or better judgment. However, this view is 
problematic. Consider the following example. An alcoholic wishing to stay abstinent may now 
judge that, all things considered, it would be better to stay home and watch television than go 
to the pub and have a drink with a friend. But as evening draws near, the temptation to drink 
increases, making him change his mind about what would be the better course of action – by 
giving too much weight to certain considerations that appear to provide reasons to meet with 
his friend, for example – and then revising his all things considered judgment accordingly. Is 
this a failure of self-control? Not if self-control is the contrary of akrasia. The alcoholic (unlike 
the akrates) does not act against his all things considered judgment when he chooses to meet 
up with his friend. Nevertheless, he plausibly exhibits a lack of self-control. This is because he 
revises his all things considered judgment unreasonably: he revises it, not because of the 
considerations that give him reasons to join his friend, but because he, at the time of making 
the choice, has a strong desire to drink – precisely the desire his judgment ruled out as 
outweighed by his better reasons.  
In attempting to diagnose the difficulty here, it might be pointed out that the “self” of 
self-control must involve more than what is contained in the agent’s all things considered 
judgment at the time of choice. While a self needs, for example, a certain stability over time – 
a self is not typically understood as the sort of thing that frequently changes – an agent’s all 
things considered judgment may very well change from one moment to the next. Oscillations 
in judgment, or “judgment shifts” as they are called, typically occur when influences external 
to the self (such as impulses, desires, or strong feelings) interfere with or disrupt an agent’s 
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deliberative process at the time of choice. An alternative approach, therefore, one that aims to 
preserve the stability of the self, might be to see this notion as essentially involving values the 
agent herself has endorsed or endowed with normative force (Kennett 2013). Although values, 
of course, also may change, they seem inherently to have more stability than ordinary 
judgments. As Gary Watson suggests, they express what the agent “in a cool and non-deceptive 
moment – articulates as definitive of the good, fulfilling and defensible life” (Watson 1982: 
105). Clearly, an agent’s all things considered judgment at one particular moment need not 
express such values. According to value-based self-control, then, self-controlled persons govern 
themselves in accordance with what they genuinely value even in the face of strong competing 
motivation. Since it is common to see an agent’s values as expressed by the stable set of 
attitudes she has relative to future behavior, value-based self-control is diachronic: it enables 
the agent to govern her actions across time, to maintain coherence between her long-term 
attitudes and her actions (Levy 2006). The alcoholic in the example might be said, then, to 
exhibit a lack of value-based self-control.  
Judgment-based and value-based conceptions of self-control imply different views of 
the fault involved in failures of self-control. Suppose addicts typically lack judgment-based 
self-control. That means they typically take drugs while judging, at the same time, that all things 
considered, it would be better to abstain. Since they take drugs knowingly and in full awareness 
of choosing an inferior option, their fault cannot be cognitive. It must be volitional. It must 
consist in a failure to be motivated to do what they judge best. But this might not be the correct 
view of the failure of self-control in addiction. Suppose instead that addicts typically lack value-
based self-control. As the opportunity for consumption presents itself, they typically succumb 
to a temptation to rationalize their reluctance to abstain by changing their mind about what 
would be best. At that moment, they always judge it best, all things considered, to take drugs. 
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This would suggest that their fault is cognitive. It consists in a failure to judge, at the time of 
action, that the option that represents their genuine values is the best option.  
So, is the failure of self-control in addiction typically cognitive or volitional? Let me 
start by considering a recent philosophical argument for the view that it is cognitive.  
 
2. Levy on the Impairment of Self-Control in Addiction 
The most important evidence of a self-control problem in addiction stems from addicts’ own 
reports of failed attempts to exercise restraint. This restraint typically involves effort and a 
conscious act of will. Based on the further observation that these failures tend to have 
tremendous negative consequences for the addicts’ themselves, it has been common to infer 
that addictive desires must be so powerful as to be literally irresistible. Clearly, this means, if 
correct, that addicts’ impairment of self-control must involve a volitional fault, i.e., addicts are 
perfectly aware of the best course of action – to decline the offer of a drink, to throw away the 
packet of cigarettes, to abstain from heroin – but they are just unable to motivate or incentivize 
themselves to act accordingly. There are, however, serious problems with this inference. As 
several studies have shown, financial concerns, fear of arrest, values regarding parenthood, and 
many other factors increasing the cost of drug-taking often persuade addicts to desist (Heyman 
2009; Pickard 2015). In fact, addiction often appears to involve a choice process, a conscious 
weighing up of the costs and benefits of different options. This is evidence that addictive desires 
need not be irresistible.   
For some authors, self-control failure in addiction is therefore a cognitive rather than a 
volitional failure, involving the addict’s loss of control over the valuational contents of her all 
things considered judgments rather than over her motivation to act in line with these judgments 
(Levy 2014). Based on empirical evidence that addicts tend to be “hyperbolic discounters” 
(Ainslie 2001) – they tend to discount the utility of future rewards by a proportion that declines 
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as the length of the delay increases – Neil Levy has suggested that addiction creates strong 
temptations that induce regular and uncontrollable judgment shifts (Levy 2006). Such judgment 
shifts undermine self-control, he argues, because the addict fails to integrate her life sufficiently 
to pursue what she genuinely values. In other words, addiction impairs value-based self-control. 
Recently, Levy has supported this account with an argument purporting to show that the neural 
adaptations characteristic of addiction in fact provide a mechanism for such judgment shifts 
(Levy 2014; see also chapter x, this volume). While addictive drugs are widely known to 
increase dopamine by stimulating its release or decreasing its reuptake in the nucleus 
accumbens, the information carried by increased levels of dopamine is open to different 
interpretations. Of particular relevance here is a series of well-known experiments by Wolfram 
Schultz and colleagues (1992), measuring firing activity of putative midbrain dopamine 
neurons in monkeys before they learned to associate a light cue with a reward. They found that 
the dopamine signal went up when the reward was delivered, but once the association between 
cue and reward was learned, the dopamine signal went up when the light appeared but remained 
flat when the reward was delivered. Schultz and colleagues took this to show that a momentary 
increase in dopamine neuron firing activity indicates that the world contains more rewards than 
expected, or that an unexpected reward is available.  
If one of the functions of midbrain dopamine neurons is to help the organism update its 
idea of the world’s abundance of rewards, as Schultz and colleagues suggest, addiction, Levy 
claims, could plausibly be seen as a pathology of reward-based learning because drugs, unlike 
natural rewards, drive up the dopamine signal by direct chemical action on the brain. Drugs are 
therefore likely to generate a large prediction error: every time they are consumed (i.e., the 
reward is delivered) the addict’s reward system tells her that the world contains more rewards 
than expected, rather than being exactly as expected (which would have been the normal 
learning response). Based on evidence linking dysfunctions of the dopamine system with 
7 
 
pathologies of belief-formation, Levy argues that the reward system’s treatment of the drug as 
something of ever-increasing value puts pressure on addicts to adopt and endorse an available 
causal model of the world that minimizes prediction error. Since the most accessible model is 
one in which drug use is judged better than abstention, addicts are likely to adopt and endorse 
this model, he claims. So when dopamine neuron firing activity increases in the presence of 
drugs or cues predicting drug availability, addicts will shift from judging abstention, all things 
considered, better than use to judging use as better, all things considered, than abstention. 
However, once the drug is consumed and the dopamine neuron firing activity has decreased, a 
rival model of the world will be triggered, where abstention is judged better than use. The result 
is oscillation in all things considered judgments.  
Now, it is well documented that addicts generally experience difficulties in attempting 
to control future behavior and pursue long-term goals of abstinence. Levy is probably correct 
that judgment shifts occur more frequently in addicts than in non-addicts. In the next section, 
however, I shall argue that there still are good reasons to resist the claim that loss of control 
over all things considered judgment is the only, or even the typical, form the impairment of 
self-control takes in addiction. 
 
3. Cravings and Failure of Impulse Control 
If one of the functions of midbrain dopamine neurons is indeed error prediction, these error 
predictions most likely lie outside of consciousness (Schroeder 2011). This means that a lot 
hinges on Levy’s assumption that the error is passed on to higher levels of the processing 
hierarchy. According to Levy, minimizing the prediction error creates pressure on these higher 
levels to adopt and endorse the model that constitutes the judgment that drug use is, all things 
considered, best. It is “the model,” Levy writes, “of the drug’s place in the world, which the 
person endorsed in the earlier stages of drug use when drug use was controlled and chosen for 
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its rewards” (Levy 2014: 348). It will be adopted and endorsed because it is the “most easily 
accessible” and most “easily available for recall” (ibid., 348). This claim raises difficult 
questions about what makes a model “easily accessible.” Clearly, addicts differ immensely in 
terms of psychological and social circumstances, personal resources, severity of addiction and 
so on. Is the same model of the world equally “accessible” to all addicts in spite of these 
differences? Levy could be right that the model that drug use is, all things considered, best 
might be the “most easily accessible” model to a young cocaine addict trying to quit for the first 
time. But why assume this model is equally accessible to the middle-aged nicotine addict who 
has desperately and unsuccessfully struggled with addiction for many years? She might not get 
any real pleasure out of smoking anymore. She might even wonder why she ever started given 
how little she now values smoking. Will the model of smoking’s place in the world that she 
endorsed in the early stages of her addiction (possibly decades ago!) for its rewards be the one 
“most easily accessible” every time some smoke-related cue boosts her dopamine levels and 
she feels a craving to smoke? I confess I find this hard to believe.  
The main problem with the judgment shift view, however, is that it ignores the role of 
cravings in the development and maintenance of addiction. It is widely agreed that 
dopaminergic activity in addicts is linked to experiences of drug cravings. A natural place to 
start, then, in interpreting the information carried by this activity, would be to focus on the role 
cravings play in deliberation and action guidance. Cravings appear to belong to the same 
category of simple motivation as “impulses” and “urges.” Such motivations differ in important 
ways from more complex forms of cognitive motivation involving beliefs, desires, or 
judgments. For example, they can be very hard to separate from the actions they produce – such 
as the impulse to scratch produced by an itch, or the impulse to laugh in response to a joke can 
be hard to separate from the experience of scratching or laughing. Usually, it is when an impulse 
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for some reason is not immediately translated into action that it comes into conscious awareness 
and is experienced as an “urge” or a “craving” (West 2006). 
Now, if craving is a form of impulse or urge, “yielding to temptation” might mean 
something quite different when it is caused by a craving than by a more complex form of 
cognitive motivation. Consider cases where loss of control is mediated by judgment shifts. 
Here, an agent yields to temptation by failing to restrain herself from re-evaluating her options 
when the tempting object becomes available. Plausibly, one explanation of what drives this 
process is an anticipation that she is likely to succumb, combined with a desire to avoid the 
experience of dissonance by choosing an option she believes is less valuable than the alternative 
(Holton 2009). Since she decides to succumb after weighing the costs and benefits of the 
alternative options, she will – as Levy points out (quoting Austin) – “succumb to temptation 
with calm and even finesse” (Levy 2014: 352). But even if loss of control can often be quite 
deliberate, involving the weighing of costs and benefits, it is surely, sometimes, not very 
deliberate! The best evidence of this comes from cases where people appear to be taken by 
surprise by their own failures to resist their urges or impulses. I am thinking here of actions 
performed under the influence of sudden anger, sexual arousal, or, perhaps hunger. What drives 
such failures does not seem to be any process involving anticipation and re-evaluation. Not only 
do they happen too quickly for that (often in the midst great emotional turmoil), it is not unusual 
for people acting under impulse to find themselves regretting the action as they are carrying it 
out, sometimes even trying to exercise restraint at that very moment (“I can’t believe I am doing 
this! I should stop right now”). While they may well realize they are about to do something they 
judge it would be better not to do, the reason yielding to temptation in such cases is not mediated 
by judgment shifts is that the actions occur before the weighing of pros and cons. Clearly, an 
agent doesn’t fail to control an impulse by first judging that performing the impulsive action is, 
all things considered, the best thing to do! Before discussing some of the evidence suggesting 
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that diminished impulse control is prevalent among addicts, let me first briefly consider a 
different conception of self-control, one that is common in the psychological literature. 
 
4. Broad Psychological Self-Control  
One reason for thinking that addiction impairs self-control might be that it seems close to being 
a conceptual truth that a person who is actively addicted to a drug must have impaired control 
over her consumption of that drug. Consider, for example, the suggestion that a certain nicotine 
addict who smokes 60 cigarettes a day is in “full control” of her smoking behavior. I think most 
people would be inclined to find this claim odd, indeed, even contradictory (“An addict who 
smokes three packs a day? Obviously, her consumption is out of control!”). If this is correct, it 
suggests that some notion of impaired control might be inherent in the commonsense notion of 
addiction. Is it equally odd to assume that the nicotine addict genuinely believes smoking in 
general to be fine, indeed even better, all things considered, than not smoking? Clearly this 
assumption is less odd. Many addicts don’t make a serious effort to abstain from drugs. Some 
don’t even want to. It seems perfectly possible to imagine many of them acting, most of the 
time, in accordance with their consciously held all things considered judgments when they 
choose to use. Still, insofar as they are “addicted,” there seems to be a sense in which they 
cannot be in “full control” of their consumption. Is that because they are behaving contrary to 
what they genuinely value as seen from their own long-term perspective? 
There doesn’t seem to be anything odder about the claim that smoking is something the 
nicotine addict genuinely values from the vantage point of her own long-term perspective. Not 
all addicts are ambivalent, vacillating, or conflicted about their drug use (Flanagan 2016). 
Imagine, for example, a non-addicted recreational smoker who genuinely values smoking, 
perhaps because she associates it with a cool lifestyle. Suppose her smoking escalates and 
becomes an addiction. Although this means her smoking becomes excessive, she may have no 
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desire to quit. Her long-term perspective and value system remain the same throughout and 
beyond this transitional phase and she regulates her life in accordance with her values. Still, 
when she does become addicted, most people would be inclined, I think, to deny that she is in 
full control of her cigarette smoking.  
In fact, there seem to be many cases where it is at best unclear whether the addicts have 
lost value-based self-control. Consider, for example, those described in the clinical literature as 
“severe, chronic addicts,” i.e., people who have exhibited signs of dependency for many years 
(sometimes decades). The search for and use of drugs may now be the single most important 
activity in their lives, completely dominating their thinking, emotions, and behavior. For some 
of them, we may suppose, it might even define who they think and feel they are and become 
part of their practical identity. If this is the case, drug-oriented values may be precisely what 
imposes a cross-temporal structure on their thoughts and actions. It is difficult to see in what 
sense these addicts should be failing to regulate their life in accordance with their own values. 
But even so, most people, I think, would be inclined to say that they are not in full control of 
their drug-oriented behavior.   
What all these examples have in common is the suggestion of a sense in which addicts 
seem to have lost an important form of self-control even when engaging in drug-seeking or 
drug-taking behavior does not give rise to the kinds of normative conflict associated with 
failures of value-based or judgment-based self-control. In fact, one might reasonably wonder 
how often people – even self-controlled people – really act on the basis of conscious judgments 
informed by comparisons of all the relevant available reasons for and against the alternative 
options, or in accordance with coherent sets of values they in a cool and non-deceptive moment 
would articulate as definitive of the good, fulfilling and defensible life. It is quite plausible, I 
think, that both exercises in self-control, as well as failures of self-control, can occur 
independently of whether these rather demanding conditions obtain. Imagine again the nicotine 
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addict – let us call her Beth – who “in a cool and non-deceptive moment” has decided, based, 
we can assume, on a careful weighing of the benefits and risks of smoking (pleasant feelings, 
enjoyable rituals, probability of lung cancer, and so on), that she wants to continue smoking 
one more year before she quits. Suppose Beth is at a party and is overcome by a strong urge to 
smoke another cigarette. However, at that moment she suddenly remembers a TV program 
featuring a terminally ill lung cancer patient. Even though she discounted the risk of lung cancer 
in her previous “cool” assessment, the disturbing image of this person now triggers an 
emotional response causing her, without any consideration of pros and cons, to try to override 
her urge to smoke another cigarette. Unfortunately, her attempt at restraint fails. Is this a failure 
of self-control? It seems very plausible. A sudden feeling of anxiety activated a goal (not to 
smoke another cigarette) which caused her to make an effort to refrain from lighting another 
cigarette. Yet although Beth fails in that goal, she does not act contrary to an all things 
considered judgment. Indeed, she did not make any, and if she had made one at that moment, 
it would likely have been that smoking another cigarette was, all things considered, better than 
not smoking one (once she has lit the cigarette she may be content that she failed!). Neither 
does Beth act contrary to what she genuinely values either.  
In the psychological literature Beth’s failure would be treated as a paradigmatic example 
of a failure of self-control. Although it is difficult to find a very precise definition of self-control 
in this literature, it tends to be used in the sense of involving a conscious effort to override or 
inhibit competing urges, behaviors, or desires in order to attain particular goals. Since Beth 
makes a conscious effort to act in accordance with a mental goal representation of herself 
refraining from smoking another cigarette (a representation that does not include a 
comprehensive assessment of relevant available reasons to choose or reject any of the 
alternative options), but fails to override the urge to smoke, she fails to behave in conformity 
with her mental goal representation, and hence to exercise self-control. She is not, however, 
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guilty of any value-based or judgment-based failure of self-control. Often, the term self-control 
is used, in the psychological literature, interchangeably with “self-regulation,” which refers, 
even more broadly, to all higher-order (i.e., executive) control of lower-order processes that 
adapt thought, emotions, or behavior to the demands of the situation and the agent’s goal(s) 
within that situation, including cognitive and motivational operations that are performed 
automatically and unconsciously (Fitzsimons and Bargh 2004). In the next section I shall argue 
that malfunctions in capacities associated with self-control in this broad psychological sense 
undermine addicts’ self-control also in the absence of failures of value-based or judgment-based 
self-control. 
 
5. Addiction as a Disorder of Self-Control  
It is widely believed that one of the most important higher-order-control functions is associated 
with directed attention, i.e., the capacity to voluntarily focus or shift attention (Baumeister and 
Heatherton 1996). Directed attention represents a common regulatory mechanism for emotion, 
cognition, and behavior. As MacCoon and colleagues (2004) note, it is a top-down mechanism 
“capable of enhancing appropriate cognitions, emotions, or behaviors, and suppressing 
inappropriate cognitions, emotions, or behaviors” (ibid., 422). It is crucial for self-control not 
only because it is necessary for maintaining focus on longer-range goals, concerns or values, 
but also because it is required for making conscious efforts to override or inhibit competing 
motivations. Thus, measures of effortful control often include indices of attention-regulation 
(Eisenberg 2004).  
In a much cited article from 2008, Matt Field and W. Miles Cox review evidence 
suggesting that addicts’ attention is biased toward drug-associated stimuli. Much of this 
evidence comes from experiments measuring impairment in attention and impulse control such 
as the addiction Stroop task, where the addict must name the print color of a drug-related word 
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and inhibit the stronger tendency to read the name of a color itself. While addicts exhibit 
significantly slower reaction times and are more prone to error when naming the color of drug-
related words, control participants do not exhibit this pattern. The standard interpretation of this 
Stroop interference is that drug-related words capture addicts’ attention causing excessive 
processing of the semantic content of these words, thereby disrupting their color naming. What 
it seems to suggest is that addicts find it particularly difficult to ignore salient, drug-related 
stimuli, or exercise directed attention (which, as noted above, is required for both planning and 
inhibition) in the presence of drugs or cues predicting drug availability. This hypothesis appears 
to be corroborated by neuroscientific evidence showing that repeated drug use “sensitizes” 
certain regions in the brain involved in the motivation of behavior, making them more easily 
activated by drug-related cues or circumstances. As the neuroscientists Robinson and Berridge 
note, such sensitization “produces a bias of attentional processing towards drug-associated 
stimuli” (Robinson and Berridge 2008).  
Now, it should be noted that not all researchers are convinced of the cogency of the 
evidence for attentional bias in addiction (see e.g., Hogarth this volume). However, in what 
follows I shall assume it is correct. Given this hypothesis, it would be reasonable to infer that 
cravings are triggered by cues or circumstances via entrenched patterns of attention. A likely 
effect of such entrenched patterns is a dramatic increase in cognitive load on higher-order 
functions requiring directed attention, such as inhibition, reasoning, or planning. That is 
because, unlike non-addicts, every time addicts engage in these activities, they have to make an 
effort not to attend disproportionally to drug-related cues or considerations. If all higher-order 
functions draw on the same limited resource (as many psychologists believe), and the more of 
this resource is consumed the more depleted it becomes, then the more depleted addicts will 
become compared with non-addicts (which is, of course, exactly what the addiction Stroop task 
shows). Entrenched patterns of attention combined with subsequent depletion reduce the 
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capacity to switch thinking and attention among different tasks or operations in response to 
changing goals or circumstances. This must have important normative consequences because it 
plausibly results in a more inflexible and stimulus-bound practical perspective. Depending on 
individual differences between addicts (e.g., differences in personal and social resources), such 
a perspective might be hypothesized to affect their behavior in a variety of ways. For example, 
by restricting or altering the reasons that are salient to them, it might act as an option-limiting 
cause in some cases. In other words, reasons to abstain from drugs may no longer be recognized 
as reasons in the presence of drugs or cues predicting drug availability, resulting in a systematic 
biasing of their practical deliberation, e.g., an over-appreciation of drug-associated features of 
situations, or blindness to longer-range goals. This, of course, would explain why judgment 
shifts occur more frequently in addicts than in non-addicts (p. 7). However, as I have argued, 
self-control failures in addiction might take other forms than loss of control over all things 
considered judgments. Many addicts plausibly recognize the harmful effects of drug use on 
their lives even as they are seeking or taking them. For them the greatest difficulty might not 
be to see the salience of alternative reasons at the time of choice, or to judge what the best 
course of action is, all things considered, at that point in time, but to get themselves to act on 
these reasons or judgments. An inflexible and stimulus-bound practical perspective makes this 
very difficult because the frequency, cue-dependency, and computational speed of cravings 
produced via entrenched patterns of attention are likely to deplete their inhibitory mechanisms, 
hence making it harder for them to override these cravings – even if overriding them is precisely 
what they believe they should be doing.  
Together, the biasing and depletion effects associated with an inflexible and stimulus-
bound practical perspective are likely to make it, overall, very difficult for addicts to revise or 
abandon their drug-oriented behavioral pattern even if they are given good and sufficient 
reasons to do so. This, I contend, is the sense in which impaired self-control is a defining feature 
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of addiction. Difficulties associated with revising or abandoning such a pattern even in the 
presence of good and sufficient reasons to do so, do not imply that addicts’ cravings for drugs 
must be irresistible, nor that addicts cannot often take themselves to have reasons – even good 
reasons – to use drugs, reasons which, on many occasions, might play a part in the explanation 
of their addictive behavior. First, an inflexible and stimulus-bound practical perspective does 
not rule out a capacity to resist cravings. It just makes it harder over time to do so, requiring a 
more sustained effort, and hence increasing the likelihood of failure. Second, there is plenty of 
evidence that many addicts use drugs to cope with stressful or traumatic experiences. Such 
experiences may give them reasons to take drugs, reasons that form an important part of the 
explanation of their addictive behavior (Pickard 2015). Using drugs for such reasons, however, 
does not rule out the importance of diminished attentional and impulse control in this 
explanation. My central claim in this chapter is that if a person is genuinely addicted to a 
particular drug, that implies that she is disposed to suffer from impaired self-control with 
respect to its use.  
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